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EXTENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF URBAN
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FREDERICK L. BiRD*
The general property tax has developed a degree of unreliability since i93o which
has been particularly disconcerting to municipal governments throughout the United
States. But whatever may be said of its imperfections, it continues to be the chief
dependence of the local revenue system and, as such, has special need for an appraisal
based on recent performance.
The peculiar importance of this major source of municipal revenue may best be
determined by consideration of its relation to the budget. It is, in the first place, a
deficiency tax. The budget makers, in arriving at the revenue estimate for the year,
customarily total the miscellaneous items, usually minor in amount, and then set the
general property tax levy at a figure which will fill the broad gap to bring revenues
into balance with appropriations. While this procedure is not tenable in those
municipalities which operate under a rigid tax rate limitation, it is so generally the
practice as to emphasize the necessity for stability and regularity in the inflow of
ad valorem tax receipts.
Not only is the general property tax depended upon to provide sixty per cent or
more of the annual operating revenue in most municipalities, but in the past it has
been rather universally treated, in the making of budgets, as a thoroughly stable
source of income. Revenue estimates ordinarily included the full tax levy for the
year, without thought of reserves for possible deficiencies in collection, and depended
either on the receipt of delinquent taxes or on temporary borrowing to make up any
shortage in the income from the current levy. Uniform budget laws in a few states,
in fact, went so far as to make this procedure practically mandatory. Thus the
typical budget system, as well as the local revenue system, was geared to the de-
pendability of the general property tax.
What might be called the hand-to-mouth existence of the average city also imposes
the requirement of reliability on ad valorem taxes. Very few cities build up large
cash reserves for operating purposes. Most of them depend on the current receipts
of each year to care for the year's current eipenses, and the great majority find it
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regularly necessary to do temporary borrowing in anticipation of taxes, particularly
as fiscal years and tax collection periods are not, as a rule, well synchronized.
With the majority of cities conducting current operations partially on credit there
is still further dependence on the regularity of the major source of income. While
tax anticipation loans have long been a popular medium for short term investment,
recent experience has shown that their availability cannot be relied upon in a crisis
when the rate of repayment becomes uncertain. And not only is steadiness of pri-
mary income a controlling factor in determining the rate and availability of short
term credit, but it has come to be a very influential factor in a municipality's ability
to sell bonds advantageously. Few items *are scanned more carefully by prospective
creditors than the record of tax collections.
Scientific methods of control in the execution of the budget, finally, offer com-
paratively little relief when receipts from taxes fail to measure up to expectations.
Because of the preponderance of fixed and quasi-fixed charges there is a relatively
small margin in any municipal budget for the underspending of appropriations to
meet a sudden shrinkage in income. To principal and interest requirements for
debt, often reaching one-third or more of the total budget, there must be added such
fixed charges as those for retirement funds. Salary schedules and increments are
often fixed by charter or statute and therefore not subject to hasty reduction, and
most of the municipal functions performed are of such basic utility to the community
as to prevent their drastic curtailment. Certain of them such as welfare, in fact,
tend to become more demanding in periods of declining capacity to collect revenue.
In. some jurisdictions, moreover, cities acting as the collection agencies for school
district, ounty and state taxes are required by law to remit these levies in full each
year, irrespective, of funds actually received.
Most municipalities, in other words, entered the period of the depression with
their ability to maintain operations adequately, to meet their obligations promptly,
to sustain their solvency, and to cope with the special demands of unemployment,
dependent on revenue and budget systems which presupposed a steady, even flow of
general property taxes which would approximate each year's levy.
Even in the middle i92o's tax delinquency in some cities began to show a grad-
ually upward trend, particularly where land and building booms had created an
unsubstantial tax base. There was a warning in this movement which might have
been noted, had the tax delinquency index received the amount of attention more
recently accorded it. Through I93o, however, the increase in delinquency had not
become universal and it had not gained sufficient momentum to threaten seriously
the balancing of municipal budgets. The median year-end tax delinquency for 150
cities of over 50,ooo population in x93o was 10.15 per cent, a record still sufficiently
close to normal to make its reattainment appear, at the present time, a fairly satis-
factory objective of recovery.
The accompanying chart shows the median year-end delinquency for 15o cities
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of over 50,000 population from x93o through 1935 inclusive. The percentages repre-
sent delinquency at the close of each fiscal year on that year's levy only and do not
reflect the likewise retarded collections of delinquent taxes. Including, as they do,
79 per cent of all cities in their population classes, they give a reasonably accurate
picture of the average experience of the more important cities generally throughout
the country.
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In 1931 the mean delinquency rose 445 points to 14.6 per cent, still a fairly com-
fortable state of affairs from our present point of view. But in 193: taxpayers
stopped paying taxes in earnest and delinquency rose to 19.95 per cent. The follow-
ing year brought with it its sweeping inundation of bank closings and frozen funds
and tax delinquency reached a peak, in 1933, of 26.35 per cent. The average mu-
nicipality, in other words, had suffered an increase of x6.2. points in delinquency.
from i93o and was able to collect within the year less than three-fourths of the
taxes which it had levied that year.
The median figure, needless to say, did not reflect all the realities of the situation.
At one extreme were municipalities whose year-end tax delinquency in 1933" had
mounted to thirty, forty, fifty and even as high as sixty per cent. It is not strange
that under such circumstances some of them reached the financial breaking point.
At the other extreme, a not inconsiderable number of cities continued to enjoy ex-
cellent tax collections, some of them showing better results in 1933 than had the
average city in x93o and some experiencing a relatively small increase from normal
delinquency.
340 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Not only was the average city faced with the failure to receive over a fourth of
its 1933 taxes when due, but it was confronted with an ominous cessation of de-
linquent tax receipts which in former years had been depended on to supply the
difference. It was the exceptional city that had total tax collections in 1933 reaching
90 per cent of the year's levy and it was not unusual to find them falling to 70 per
cent or even lower. This predicament posed. problems of fiscal administration and
policy which have not yet received all the consideration called for, and it encouraged
serious concern as to even the ultimate collectibility of large segments of revenue
assets which in times past had been confidently depended on. Tax collection ad-
ministration, budget making and the municipal revenue system lay open to more
critical analysis in the light of the weaknesses exposed.
Belying the forebodings of the forecasters of disaster for municipal governments
generally, tax collections in 1934 took a turn for the better, with a medium improve-
ment of 3.3 points from the peak of 1933 to a year-end delinquency level of 23.o5
per cent. While this very modest degree of improvement fell short of reducing the
general average even to the 1932 level, it was somewhat reassuring because it was
participated in by 83 per cent of the 150 cities. A further cause for encouragement
was the influx of back taxes, but this was partially discounted as a dependable index
because of the more than $ioooooooo advanced for this purpose by the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation.
The continued decline in tax delinquency in 1935 was somewhat more conclusive
as the median year-end ratio dropped 5.05 points to i8 per cent, indicating that half
the ground lost since i93o had been regained. Here again, however, the degree of
recovery was so varied as to call for speculation regarding the causes. While some
of the gains by individual cities were still negligible and a few continued to lose
ground, 26 of the i5o collected a higher percentage of the year's taxes in 1935 than
they did in i93o and nine others came within a very small margin of equalling their
i93o records. The list includes both New York and Philadelphia.
In only a very few of this distinguished group can the results be attributed to a
taxpaying capacity superior to that of i93o or to drastically lower tax levies. For
most of them changes in tax collection procedure have been either a contributing or
dominating influence. These changes included the institution of quarterly tax pay-
ments, the billing of taxes earlier in the fiscal year, the elimination of personal
property taxes in the instance of New York, the advancement of delinquency dates
and increase of penalties, the holding of more regular tax sales, and the provision of
an instalment system and the remission of penalties on back taxes, contingent upon
the prompt payment of current taxes. A more pertinent demonstration would
hardly be needed that a goodly portion of the unreliability in general property tax
revenue has been the result of faulty administration rather than incapacity to pay.
Somewhat counteracting- the fear that the depression would leave many munic-
ipalities crippled by the permanent loss of large amounts of revenue anticipated in
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their tax levies has been the continuation of the influx of back taxes which began in
X934. By the close of 1933 many cities found themselves with uncollected taxes
approximating or even exceeding an entire year's levy. It is the liberating of these
frozen assets which is expediting municipal financial recovery to a degree not
reflected in the slow return toward normal of tax collections within the year of levy.
The average city, in 1935, had the novel experience of collecting a slightly larger
amount of taxes than called for in the current levy. In iI cities of over 50,000 pop-
ulation the median ratio of total collections to the year's levy was ioi per cent. In
only 19 did total collections fall below 95 per cent and at the other extreme they
rose to such levels as 122.9 per cent in Seattle and io9.6 per cent in Philadelphia.
Except in a minority of instances in which delinquent taxes were pledged as security
for debt, the effect was to simplify the balancing of 1935 budgets and to facilitate
balanced operations in 1936.
A preliminary sampling of the tax collection trend in 1936, based on 50 repre-
sentative cities, shows current collections averaging 4.1 points better than in 1935 and
suggests a probable decline in year-end delinquency to the level of 1931.
Still further refuting the fear that the deflationary influences -of the depression
would necessitate the ultimate writing off, as unrealizable, of large amounts of levied
taxes is the record of recent delinquency on the tax levies of the last four years. It
appears that when tax collection administration is organized with even a moderate
degree of effectiveness the losses on realty taxes, under average conditions, will be
very small. * This does not always apply to personal property taxes, but their relative
proportion of the total is sufficiently small, as a rule, to have but a minor effect on
total results. In the case of taxes based on speculatively valued unimproved property
some losses may be anticipated, but on the whole the collection of delinquent taxes
is producing an encouraging record. This is illustrated by the following table show-
ing the median delinquency for 97 cities over 50,000 population, on the levies of the
last four years as it stood at the close of the 1935 fiscal year. Data illustrating both
the average and the extremes are included.
DELINQUENCY ON RECENT LEviEs AT END OF 1935 FISCAL YEAR
Levy of 1935 1934 1933 1932
Median, 97 Cities ................... 17.3% 10.5% 7.0% 4.4%
Charlotte, N. C ......................... z9.8 -. 1 9.3 6"5
Chattanooga, Tenn ..................... 16.7 7.6 6.8 3.5
Newark, N. J .......................... 26.5  r.8 6.3 5.1
Yonkers, N. Y ...................... 25.1 12.8 6.5  4.6
Richmond, Va ...................... 13. 4  5.7 3.3 1.6
Bridgeport, Conn .................... II.O 6.5  3.2 1.3
Flint, Mich ........................... 28.4 20.5 20.7 15.5
Tacoma, Wash ........................ 29.7 19.2 21.8 10.3
Tampa, Fla ........................... 38.5 24.2 20.6 15.1
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Discussion thus far has concerned itself primarily with the general trend of
municipal tax delinquency. Fully as significant is the relative experience of various
types of cities in different sections of the country. The drawing of conclusions and
the making of comparisons from the year-end .delinquency records of individual
cities is somewhat hazardous because of their wide diversity in tax collection practice.
Since tax delinquency is as much an index of administrative efficiency as it is of
taxpaying capacity, there is always the question as to what part of a given delin-
quency ratio represents inability to pay and what part official negligence regarding
collection. A high end-of-year delinquency may, for example, be mitigated by an
excellent record of total collections of delinquent taxes within a short period. Both
Massachusetts and New Jersey municipalities, for example, have high year-end
delinquency records. In the case of the former, however, it is the result of very late
billing and penalty dates, with this shortcoming largely offset by the holding of
regular tax sales within a few months of the close of the fiscal year. In the case of
the latter, it has been a product of lax traditions of administration, and tax sales
often have been perfunctory or even neglected.
Year-end statistics, however, are still of ieal value in showing comparatively the
swing from normal in ability to collect taxes under adverse conditions and in reflect-
ing the .degree of synchronization between the fiscal year and the receipt of the
year's current taxes. The accompanying table shows the yeai-end delinquency record
from 193o through 1935 of 45 representative cities, selected to illustrate four typical
conditions: (i) outstandingly good records both as to promptness and stability; (2)
records of normally less satisfactory year-end results but relatively good year-to-year
stability; (3) records following closely the general average of stability; (4) records
indicating an abnormal degree of instability.
Two characteristics in particular explain the remarkably strong records of the
cities in Group I. They have unusually well rounded, ample and stable resources
and, with possibly one or two exceptions, their methods of tax collection are sound
and aggressive.
The cities of Group II likewise have the advantage of resources of better than
average stability. Hartford, for example, is a great insurance center as well as the
state capital, while in Bayonne well entrenched industries pay over half the taxes.
Tax collection administration, however, varies as to effectiveness, with considerable
laxity of method in Bayonne, Charleston and Jacksonville and with effective pressure
delayed to the second year in the Massachusetts cities.
No such generalization is possible for the rather normal delinquency trend of the
cities in Group III. None suffered more than the average from the depression, but
the majority was somewhat lacking in effective collection methods. Glendale and
New Britain, with more than average efficiency of administration, did better than
might have been anticipated, while New York City restored its collections to the
i93o level in 1935 largely through tax and administrative reforms.
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THE TREND oF TAx DELINQUENCY, 1930-1935
Forty-five Representative Cities over 50,000 Population
Percentage of Delinquency on Year's Levy Points Points
City Year Ending Increase RecoveryK1930- Through
1930 1933 Pek 1935
Group I .........
Albany, N. Y ........
Berkeley, Cal .........
Binghampton, N. Y....
Denver, Colo .........
Fresno, Cal ..........
Louisville, Ky ........
Oakland, Cal .........
Providence, R. I ......
San Francisco, Cal ....
San Jose, Cal .........
Group 11 ........
Atlanta, Ga ..........
Bayonne, N. J ........
Cambridge, Mass .....
Charleston, S. C ......
Dallas, Tex ..........
Hartford, Conn .......
Jacksonville, Fla.
Manchester, N. H .....
Newton, Mass ........
Utica, N. Y ..........
Group III .......
Fort Worth, Tex .....
Glendale, Calif ......
Harrisburg, Pa .......
Kalamazoo, Mieh .....
Lancaster, Pa .........
Memphis, Tenn ........
Mount Vernon N. Y...
New Britain Conn.
New York City, N. Y..
Omaha, Nebr .........
Group IV ........
Altoona, Pa..........
Asheville, N. C ........
Atlantic City, N. J .....
Beaumont, Tex ........
Canton, 0 ............
Detroit, Mich ........
Erie, Pa.............
Flint, Mich ...........
Hoboken, N. J ........
Johnstown, Pa ........
McKeesport, Pa .......
North Bergen N. J....
Tacoma, Wash ....
Tampa, Fla ..........
Youngstown, 0 .......
Median, 150 Cities over
50,000 Population...
Outstanding Records of Prompt Collection and Stability
7.6 8.2 11.1 13.6 10.5 8.1 6.0
2.9 3.3 4.8 7.3 5.6 4.9 4.4
3.3 4.5 6.9 8.8 8.7 7.3 5.5
3.1 4.3 7.7 10.2 5.4 4.4 7.1
2.0 2.6 4.8 7.5 5.0 4.2 5.5
8.5 10.2 10.5 13.7 10.3 9.3 5.2
3.8 4.7 6.6 9.0 7.7 6.5 5.2
0.8 0.9 1.0 2.0 3.2 4.2 3.4
1.5 1.6 2.2 5.4 4.9 3.3 3.9
0.5 1.5 2.4 5.6 4.6 3.0 5.1
Normally Less Prompt Collections Showing Good Record of Stability
14.6 16.3 20.0 20.7 13.4 10.7 6.1 1F
20.5 19.4 23.9 26.8 25.0 24.9 6.3
26.9 27.2 30.6 33.9 30.1 26.7 7.0
20.7 26.8 27.0 26.3 21.7 18.7 6.3
11.6 14.4 12.9 16.0 14.1 10.2 4.4
8.8 8.8 10.6 15.0 15.1 12.8 6.3
25.1 23.4 26..6 27.0 20.0 18.0 1.9
12.3 13.0 17.0 18.7 15.4 15.2 6.4
24.2 25.8 29.6 32.3 31.3 24.1 8.0
9.3 12.8 15.4' 16.0 16.2 14.4 6.9
Closely Following the Average Trend
14.4 16.8 21.4 28.2 27.5 24.7 13.8
3.7 7.6 14.3 16.4 15.4 10.9 12.7
6.2 11.0 17.4 22.6 18.2 12.9 16.4
5.7 9.2 16.3 24.9 15.2 13.9 19.2 1:
8.7 9.9 16.2 22.4 17.4 11.0 13.7 1:
12.6 16.8 22.4 25.9 23.1 21.7 13.3 ,
11.2 14.0 22.3 30.5 26.0 20.0 19.3 lF
8.8 12.7 14.2 16.9 14.4 11.9 8.1
14.6 17.7 26.5 26.4 21.2 15.8 11.9 1
5.5 7.9 14.9 19.3 16.9 14.0 13.8
Showing Excessive Instability in Depression
15.9
26.0
36.1
9.2
8.8
10.8
17.4
9.5
19.9
15.1
10.0
17.8
13.4
8.1
10.15
23.4
30.2
43.1
12.2
13.5
17.2
21.3
17.2
24.2
20.4
12.7
48.1
25.8
21.9
15.1
14.60
36.8
47.8
55.5
22.0
25.7
25.0
27.6
25.2
33.7
33.5
26.7
57.3
32.5
34.2
33.4
19.95
41.7
53.7
63.6
33.5
34.9
34.8
47.1
36.6
43.0
47.1
34.2
60.2
46.6
44.8
42.1
26.35
33.5
49.4
49.2
26.9
27.2
31.3
46.6
32.1
41.4
37.9
28.4
54.2
33.3
37.1
35.2
23.05
29.2
37.4
40.3
22.2
19.1
25.5
26.0
28.4
40.8
29.3
14.0
44.8
29.7
38.5
28.7
18.0
25.8
27.7
27.5
24.3
26.1
24.0
29.7
27.1
23.1
32.0
24.2
28.8
31.4
34.0
16.2
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The cities of Group IV readily identify themselves in the classification of those
upon which the ravages of the depression fell the most severely. Two-thirds of them,
moreover, were forced to default on debt. They include cities dependent upon a
single dominant industry-notably automotive, rubber, steel, building material, rail-
road shops, recreation; cities which were victims of ecessive real estate promotion;
and cities which experienced the most severe banking disorders. Another character-
istic stands out strongly, however. Not one of the fifteen had an outstandingly
satisfactory system of tax collection administration and those of the majority were
notably mediocre or weak.
Accumulated delinquency needs to be studied in conjunction with the year-end
trend to determine the effect of the depression on municipal tax collections. The
relation of the total accumulation of delinquent taxes at the close of 1935 to the levy
of that year offers opportunity for significant comparisons. Data for Xo8 cities of
over 50,000 population show the median figure for the entire group to have been
484 per cent, indicating that the average municipality was slightly less than one-half
year's levy short of realizing the total taxes due at the close of the last fiscal year.
As in the case of year-end delinquency, a small group of cities was particularly out-
standing for ability to collect taxes. Thirteen of the io8 showed an accunulated
delinquency ratio of less than 25 per cent. Binghamton, N. Y., Providence, San
Francisco and Cedar Rapids, Iowa, had ratios below io per cent. At the other
extreme, ii cities had accumulated tax arrears at the close of 1935 in excess of the
"year'i levy.
Again generalization is complicated by variations in administration as well as in
taxpaying capacity. The cities of California, by and large, secured the best results,
with most of those of New England, New York, Maryland, and the middle western
farm states showing better than average records. The municipalities of Florida,
Michigan, Ohio, New Jersey, Washington and South Carolina, on the other hand,
had, in general, the poorest records. Throughout the country, however, there is a
strong correlation between the rate of delinquency and the combined factors of
stability of resources and methods of administration.
The effect of tax delinquency during the depression on the balancing of budgets
has been by no means uniformly in proportion to ability to collect taxes. True, those
cities which have enjoyed high and prompt collections have had a relatively simple
problem of budget balancing, as even the perfunctory policy of depending on the
receipt of tax arrears to offset current delinquency at no time left them far short of
the cash needed to cover appropriations.
The budgetary experience of cities whose delinquencies approached the average
or ran higher, however, was closely related to the effectiveness of the method em-
ployed in estimating receipts. Cities which computed estimated receipts, both of
current and delinquent taxes, on the basis of actual experience and reasonable ex-
pectations were able to hold their operations near enough to a balanced basis to
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avoid financial difficulties even in the most unproductive years. This was done suc-
cessfully by a few cities whose year-end delinquency ran as high as 35 per cent. The
situation did create a serious dilemma, however, for the maintenance of cash basis
operations necessitated inflation of the tax levy and the imposition of. a more than
normal burden on the actual taxpayers to offset the failure of the delinquents.
A great many cities, particularly in the eastern states, however, made no recogni-
tion in their receipt estimates of the trend of tax delinquency. By i932, as a con-
sequence, they had piled up large cash deficits and by the close of 1933 were con-
fronted by an almost unmanageable state of affairs. In many instances banks had
continued to permit the piling up of operating loans and thus had encouraged the
maintenance of lax policies. In areas where tax sales were continued regularly and
budgets contained reserves sufficient to offset taxes ultimately uncollectible, short
term credit usually was still extended when banks had facilities to do so. But where
normally lax tax collection administration became more undependable, cities fre-
quently found themselves with their means of financing suddenly terminated. In
some instances this precipitated default and, in many others, necessitated the working
out of elaborate plans of deficit funding. New York City, for example, had an
operating debt of a quarter of a billion dollars at the close of 1933 and was forced
to enter into an agreement with the barikers which was little short of a temporary
receivership.
The great majority of such cities have now succeeded, by one means or another,
in stabilizing their current accounts, although some will still be engaged, twenty,
thirty and even forty years from now, in paying off the bonds floated to finance their
operating deficits of the depression. The fact remains, however, that many cities
have not improved their budget making policies to guard against the future re-
currence of this type of predicament, and many have not altered their methods of
tax collection administration to assure themselves of steadier revenues and of sounder
credit for emergency borrowing should it become necessary.
The rige of urban tax delinquency has been discussed factually as one of the dis-
turbing phenomena of the depression and the general economic and administrative
causes have been pointed out. Brief consideration of the types of property which
contributed most to abnormal delinquency, however, will throw further light on
possible means of securing greater stability for the major source of municipal income.
The evidence points to real estate speculation and the inadequate municipal control
of subdivisions as generally responsible for the worst elements of tax delinquency.
An intensive survey of urban tax delinquency in 62 cities conducted by the Bureau
of the Census, Division of Real Estate Taxation, in I934,1 educed the facts that the
median rate of delinquency among ten types of property was highest for vacant lots,
second and third highest for apartment houses and multiple dwellings and fourth
highest for hotels.
'U. S. BuREU-OF THE CENSUS, R r TAx DuLNQuENcY (1934).
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The most thorough extensive analysis of types of tax delinquency which has been
made was that of Westchester County, New York, by the staff of the Institute of
Public Administration under the auspices of the Westchester County Commission
on Government.2  This survey covered four cities and 18 towns in a well-to-do
section of the New York metropolitan area which experienced very marked growth
and speculative real estate activity in the i926's. Of 63,494 properties found to be in
arrears on 1933 taxes, 50,521 consisted of lots in subdivisions and of parcels of acreage
which contained no buildings or other structures. Of the x8,x74 of these parcels of
vacant land whose records were checked back over a period of years, one-fifth were
found to have been in arrears continuously since 1925. The survey observes, further,
that the arrears on homes would not have been sufficiently large to account for the
acute crisis in local finance which existed at the end of 1933. The analysis demon-
strated with preciseness "the fact that the greater. part of the outstanding arrears of
taxes have accumulated in all parts of the county against two types of property-
vacant lands in premature subdivisions, and large multifamily and business buildings
erected in premature apartment house and building zones." While similarly com-
plete quantitative analyses have not been made generally, the preponderance of
evidence is that the collapse of speculative real estate undertakings has been responsible
for a very large share of all abnormally high tax delinquency.
For most cities, the crisis caused by the rapid decline of receipts from general
property taxes has passed. Even without a return, as yet, to normal year-end collec-
tions, the average city is now in a position to balance its budgets readily through the
compensating influx of taxes in arrears. While the stringency -was of relatively short
duration, it not only worked havoc with the credit and the operating stability and
efficiency of a large number of municipalities but left some of them in a position
to suffer from its adverse effects for a generation. There could have been no stronger
type of demonstration of the need for all the stability possible in the major source
of municipal revenue.
A rise in tax arrears is to be anticipated in any major depression, but abnormal
increases can be largely guarded against, and unavoidable fluctuations offset by
financial planning. Any program looking toward future stability, however, must
embody provisions for synchronizing tax and fiscal years, for developing sound,
businesslike methods of tax assessing and collecting administration, and for intel-
ligent subdivision control which will discourage the excesses of real estate speculation.
Such a program calls, also, for the elimination of perfunctory and visionary revenue
estimates in the budget and the adoption of a more realistic basis for this important
aspect of budget making.
"Westchester County Commission on Government, Land Use and Local Finance (1935).
